











Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 30 March 2012




Denise Prévost, « Food Safety in China: Implicationsof Accession to the WTO », China Perspectives
[Online], 2012/1 | 2012, Online since 30 March 2015, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5807  ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.5807 
© All rights reserved
DENISE  PRÉVOST*
The accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) hashad a visible impact on its internal regulatory policy, nowhere moreso than in the area of food safety. Not only has WTO membership
provided a significant impetus for far-reaching reforms to China’s food
safety regime, but it has also supplied a “best practices” regulatory model
with which these reforms must comply. This model is laid down in the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment).
This contribution aims to examine the effect of WTO accession on food
safety in China, with a focus on the potential opportunities and chal-
lenges presented by the legal disciplines contained in the WTO’s SPS
Agreement. In view of growing recognition of the need to assess the
“human dimension” of international trade rules, this evaluation of the
impact of WTO law on the sensitive issue of food safety merits critical
attention.
First, a brief description of food safety concerns related to Chinese prod-
ucts is given to set the context for the discussion. Thereafter, the reforms
undertaken by China of its regulatory regime for food safety after its WTO
accession are sketched out and the remaining problems highlighted. This
review is followed by an examination of the trade implications of these
reforms.
The analysis then turns to the SPS Agreement to determine whether it
provides sufficient scope for China to pursue its food safety objectives, and
where the limits to such regulatory autonomy are set. The objective is to
identify the impact that these WTO rules have on China’s new food safety
regime, in order to establish whether they threaten the progress made by
China towards stronger protection against food safety risks, or instead pro-
mote a better, more rigorous regulatory model for the promotion of food
safety.
Concerns regarding safety of Chinese food
products
The safety of food produced in China is currently of widespread concern.
Weak and fragmented regulatory controls, (1) poor agricultural and veteri-
nary practices, (2) small-scale, and thus difficult to control, production of
food and agricultural products, (3) adulteration in food production
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1. In terms of the Chinese government’s Decision on Further Strengthening Food Safety Supervision of 2004,
responsibility for food safety is allocated to various Government bodies, including the Ministry of Agri-
culture (MOA), which has authority over the production of primary agricultural products; the State Ad-
ministration for Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), which supervises the quality
and hygiene of food processing; the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), which controls
food circulation and distribution; and the Ministry of Health (MOH), which oversees the catering industry.
This fragmented infrastructure for food safety is further complicated by the fact that the administrative
structure in China involves 33 provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities under the Central Gov-
ernment, 333 regions, municipalities, autonomous prefectures, and 2,861 counties and county-level mu-
nicipalities. Most of these various levels of administration have food safety control authorities reporting
to the SFDA, MOH, MOA, SAIC, and AQSIQ in their respective areas of competence. United Nations in
China, “Occasional Paper – Advancing Food Safety in China,” March 2008, p. 12, www.un.org.cn/public/
resource/2aebcd033e334d961fefb1588b70f2ab.pdf (consulted on 20 February 2012).
2. The heavy use of agricultural chemicals (e.g. pesticides and fertilisers) and veterinary drugs has been
reported as a food safety concern. Banned chemicals are still available in China and sold illegally. F.
Gale & J.C Buzby, “Imports from China and food safety issues,” Economic Information Bulletin, no. 52,
July 2009, www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib52/eib52.pdf (consulted on 20 February 2012).
3. As noted in a 2008 UN paper, “The sheer scale of China’s food industry makes the task of aligning
all Chinese food products with international standards an ongoing and arduous one. Without con-
sidering food service establishments, there are currently around 450,000 different enterprises en-
gaged in food production and processing in China. Of these, around 350,000 are small enterprises
with less than ten employees which have a collective market share of less than ten per cent but
present many of the greatest food safety challenges. In addition, there are many informal and
unregistered producers whom it is even harder to oversee and regulate.” United Nations in China,
“Occasional Paper – Advancing Food Safety in China,” op. cit., p. 6.
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Food Safety in China: Implications
of Accession to the WTO
ABSTRACT: The interaction between trade and health objectives has assumed critical importance for China since its accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The wish to improve its access to foreign markets has had a visible impact on China’s food safety policy, providing
significant impetus for far-reaching reforms. The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), to which China
is now bound as a WTO Member, sets out a “best practices” regulatory model with which national food safety regulation must comply. The
disciplines it entails on regulatory autonomy in the area of food safety may present considerable challenges for China but have the potential to
promote rationality in such regulation and to prevent food safety regulations that are based on unfounded fears or are a response to
protectionist pressures from the domestic food industry. Faced with the possibility of challenges by other WTO Members to its food safety
measures on the grounds of non-compliance with WTO rules, China has a strong incentive to improve conformity with this regulatory model,
bringing benefits not only to exporters but most importantly to its citizens.
KEYWORDS: Food safety, WTO, SPS Agreement, transparency, harmonisation, scientific assessment, regulatory autonomy.
processes, (4) and widespread corruption have all contributed to undermining
the safety level of food products. This situation has led to a number of food
scares in recent years. Examples of these are rife, including the Greenpeace
reports on excessive levels of poisonous pesticides on certain vegetables in
April 2006; (5) the discovery in 2009 by Wuhan inspectors that blood pudding
sold in Chinese markets was composed mainly of corn starch, formaldehyde,
industrial grade salt, and food colouring; (6) and findings by Chinese officials
of illegal drugs in fish farming in December 2006. (7) Other reported exam-
ples include Longkou noodles containing lead from Shandong, fake alcohol
in Guangdong, and soy sauce made from human hair. (8)
With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Decem-
ber 2001, these food-safety concerns have come to the forefront of public
and media attention. The lowering of trade barriers to Chinese products fol-
lowing its WTO accession, as mandated by the WTO agreements, has meant
that Chinese food exports have increased access to foreign markets, (9) rais-
ing fears of the spread of food safety risks to importing countries. (10) In 2008,
for instance, dumplings produced in China caused more than 700 people to
fall ill in Japan. (11) The most infamous example is that of the infant milk
scandal in 2008, where “trusted” (and thus largely unsupervised) (12) Chinese
producers of milk products, primarily the Sanlu company, were found to
have adulterated the products with melamine. (13) Melamine is an industrial
chemical used to falsely inflate the apparent protein content of products.
As Chinese producers had developed the practice of watering down their
milk, melamine could be used to boost the apparent protein content to the
levels required by regulation. However, the ingestion of the chemical by in-
fants in milk formula led to kidney damage, with six deaths and approxi-
mately 294,000 cases of illness, of which 51,900 required hospitalisation. (14)
Despite many previous complaints from Chinese citizens regarding infant
illness following Sanlu milk ingestion, nothing was done until the problem
“erupted on the international scene.” (15) Melamine-contaminated products
spread rapidly and were soon found in 46 other countries. (16) In response to
the infant milk scandal, a number of countries banned all dairy imports from
China or tightened their sanitary controls on imports of Chinese dairy prod-
ucts. Investigations into contamination of milk with melamine soon re-
vealed that the problem was more widespread than previously imagined,
with excessive melamine levels found in soya milk, yoghurt ice-cream, Mai-
lai (a dessert), poultry feed, eggs, and fish food. (17) Another such instance of
melamine contamination had already occurred in 2007, in pet food pro-
duced with vegetable proteins imported from China. It resulted in large-
scale kidney failure and death of pets in the North America, Europe, and
Australia. Leading pet food companies, such as Nestle Purina PetCare, Royal
Canin, and Menu Foods that used protein ingredients produced in China
were affected and had to initiate worldwide product recalls. (18)
These and other scares regarding the safety of food and feed exports from
China have led other WTO Members to take a particularly cautious ap-
proach to these Chinese products, imposing strict food safety controls,
which result in market access restrictions and a reduction in export revenue
for China. (19) European and Japanese bans on shrimp, honey, and other food
products from China have “reinforced the impression that both consumers
and policy makers are ready to act on safety concerns.” (20) The food industry
in China has therefore faced rising demands to meet the food safety stan-
dards required on its more lucrative export markets, such as those of the
US, EU, and Japan, or be denied entry to those markets.
The issue of food safety is, however, not only of growing importance for
China’s export earnings from food trade. There is also emerging demand
among Chinese consumers for safer food, and a willingness to voice their
concerns in this area. It has been argued that the Melamine scandal pro-
vided Chinese citizens with “an opportunity to voice their legitimate con-
cerns, usually forbidden in the strictly political field.” (21) As urban incomes
rise, and primary health issues such as basic sanitation and hygiene become
less pressing, consumers show greater consciousness of health risks from
food. Currently, food poisoning and food-borne disease remain serious
health threats in China. (22) In addition, with growing urban affluence comes
increased consumer demand for processed and pre-packaged foods, which
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4. According to The New York Times, food safety scandals in China “are proliferating, in part, because
producers operate in a cutthroat environment in which illegal additives are everywhere and cost-
effective. Manufacturers calculate correctly that the odds of profiting from unsafe practices far
exceed the odds of getting caught, experts say.” “In China, Fear of Fake Eggs and ‘Recycled’ Buns,”
The New York Times, 7 May 2011. A similar finding was reported in a United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) publication, which states: “Some producers and merchants in China’s highly
competitive market cut corners, add toxic substances, or skimp on food safety controls to fatten
razor-thin profit margins or gain some other competitive edge.” F. Gale & J.C Buzby, “Imports from
China and food safety issues,” op. cit.
5. It is reported that, “From December 2008 to February 2009, Greenpeace bought 15 commonly-
eaten fruit and vegetable samples from agricultural markets and the supermarkets Wal-Mart, Van-
guard, Lotus, and Nonggongshang, in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou respectively, and sent all
45 samples of fruits and vegetables to an independent laboratory in Qingdao for testing. The re-
sults show that only five samples out of the total 45 contained no pesticides and over 50 different
kinds of pesticides were identified on the rest.” See “Greenpeace Finds Pesticide Residues In Chi-
nese Fruit And Veg,” China CSR, 27 April 2009; Patton, Dominique “Pesticide residues still high in
Chinese vegetables” AP-FoodTechnology.com, 25 April 2006.
6. “Wealthy Chinese Are Pursuing Their Own Food Safety,” The Epoch Times, 23 December 2010.
7. “Carcinogenic Turbot Fish Affects China’s Market,”The Epoch Times, 2 December 2006; “Shandong
Turbot farmers in crisis following sales slump,” The Fish Site, 22 December 2006.
8. King & Wood PRC Lawyers, “PRC Food Safety Law: Food for Thought,” China Law Insight, 27 March
2007.
9. According to a 2008 UN paper, China’s food exports have been increasing at a rate of more than
20 percent year-on-year to reach US$27 billion in 2006. United Nations in China, “Occasional
Paper – Advancing Food Safety in China,” op. cit., p. 18. From the date of its accession until 2008,
China’s food exports to the US tripled in value, making China one of the fastest growing sources
of food imports to the US. F. Gale & J.C. Buzby, “Imports from China and food safety issues,” op.
cit.
10. In the United States, a 2007 Gallup/USA Today poll found that 46 percent of those polled were
“very concerned” and another 28 percent were “somewhat concerned” about the safety of Chinese
food exports. Jennifer Pifer, “Avoiding Chinese food products nearly impossible,” CNN, 26 July
2007.
11. Ching-Fu Lin, “Global Food Safety: Exploring key elements in an international regulatory strategy,”
Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 51, no. 3, 2011, pp. 637-696.
12. Under the Chinese system of “trusted” companies, certain reputable companies are exempted
from the generally applicable controls and are thus left largely unsupervised. Sanlu, the main
culprit in the melamine scandal, was one of these trusted companies.
13. This was done in order to meet the government’s minimum protein content requirement for raw
milk, which reportedly does not reflect the reality of China’s dairy industry. The secretary general
of the Heilongjiang Dairy Industry Association noted that between 75 percent and 90 percent of
raw milk in some provinces failed to meet the required protein level in 2007 and 2008.
14. “Ministry: Six infants possibly died of tainted milk powder,” Window of China, 1 December 2008.
15. Frederic Keck, “The contaminated milk affair,” China Perspectives, no. 2009/1, p. 88.
16. Ching-Fu Lin, “Global Food Safety: Exploring key elements in an international regulatory strategy,”
op. cit., p. 646.
17. Ibid., p. 90.
18. Julie Schmit, “Premium pet food company recalls dry foods,” USA Today, 17 April 2007; “Menu
Foods Recall Frequently asked Questions,” American Veterinary Medical Association, 2 April 2007;
“104 Deaths Reported in Pet Food Recall,” The New York Times, 28 March 2007.
19. The UN reports that food safety concerns by importers and foreign consumers may threaten the
growth in China’s food exports United Nations in China, “Occasional Paper – Advancing Food
Safety in China,” op. cit., p. 18.
20. United Nations in China, “Occasional Paper – Advancing Food Safety in China,” op. cit., p. 18. This
paper further notes that “[i]n 2006 and the first half of 2007, the USA found that 0.8 and 0.9%,
respectively, of imported Chinese foodstuffs were substandard. For the EU, the corresponding fig-
ures were 0.1% and 0.2%, respectively. For Japan, the figure for 2006 was 0.58%.”
21. Frederic Keck, “The contaminated milk affair,” op. cit., p. 88.
22. Roger Skinner, “Regulatory and Strategic Framework for Food Safety in the People’s Republic of
China,” SFDA, ADB, WHO Cooperation Project, 25 June 2007, www.adb.org/Documents/Produced-
Under-TA/37599/Food-Safety-FS-EN.pdf (consulted on 23 February 2012).
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are more susceptible to contamination by pathogens. In addition, a growing
Chinese agro-industry using new technologies, including chemical fertilisers
and pesticides, genetic modification, irradiation, and veterinary drugs, poses
new challenges for food safety controls. (23) A recent study has shown that
urban consumers in China are increasingly aware of food safety issues, and
are willing to pay a price premium for safe food. (24) This development cre-
ates an economic incentive for the Chinese food industry to address food
safety issues, aside from that arising from the need for access to foreign
markets.
However, industry initiatives alone cannot be relied upon to ensure high
levels of food safety; governmental support is needed in the form of ade-
quate regulations; infrastructure to carry out the necessary inspections,
testing, and certification; and enforcement mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance. Due to the fact that food safety risks are often not publicly visible or
ascertainable, consumers have to rely on the good practices of food pro-
ducers and retailers and the careful oversight of the government to ensure
safe food. To build the trust of consumers and foreign importers in the
safety of Chinese food products, a food safety regime that is reliable, sci-
ence-based, and rigorously applied is essential. As noted by Stearns, refer-
ring to the significant level of trust needed for food exchanges, and the
importance of regulation in building such trust: “There are few things that
make one more vulnerable than eating. Accordingly (cr)edibility is the sine
qua non of food exchange.” (25) Clearly, without considerable regulatory re-
forms in the food production and distribution sectors, efforts to address
the food safety problems in China cannot bear fruit.
Post-accession reforms in China’s food
safety regime
Efforts have been made to update and strengthen food safety controls in
China in response to demands from China’s export markets and also do-
mestic consumer concerns. In 2003, less than two years after China’s WTO
Accession, efforts were made by the Chinese government to consolidate
food safety regulation by establishing the State Food and Drug Administra-
tion (SFDA) of China, a central coordinating agency for food safety issues.
While this has facilitated addressing the problem of fragmentation of con-
trol, the SFDA has reportedly “not yet been given sufficient staff or the re-
sources to fully implement its mandate. There remains a situation where a
relatively large number of agencies are involved in the area of food safety
with overlapping responsibilities but without any practical and effective
means of coordinating the development of policy or its implementation.” (26)
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) set improving food safety as
“a critical national task, as part of realizing a vision of human-centred, sci-
ence-based development.” (27) However, many problems remained, leading
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to issue a report based on a World
Health Organization project in early 2007, (28) which pointed to remaining
gaps in China’s food safety regime and recommended urgent reforms to
strengthen and streamline coordination between different agencies involved
in food safety regulation. The primary legislation on food and feed safety
protection in China is composed of the Law on Quality and Safety of Agri-
cultural Products, the Law on the Entry and Exit of Animals and Plant Quar-
antine, the Food Hygiene Law, the Law on Animal Disease Prevention, the
Law on Import and Export Commodity Inspection, and the Law on Frontier
Health and Quarantine, together with the implementing regulations and
rules. (29) The ADB report called for enactment of an overarching “basic food
law,” which would cover all stages of food production and set out general
principles of food law. (30) It further noted the need to bring food safety re-
quirements in line with accepted international standards.
Additional impetus for increased efforts to bring about reform in China’s
food safety regime was generated by the 2008 melamine infant formula
scandal mentioned above. (31) Subsequently, on 28 February 2009, the new
PRC Food Safety Law was approved by the National People’s Congress, and
entered into force on 1 June 2009. (32) This law provides a legal basis for the
government to strengthen food safety control “from farm to fork.” It sets
out requirements for risk assessments and scientific methods in food safety
regulation. It further consolidates hundreds of regulations and standards
and sets out stricter penalties for producers of unsafe food products. (33) In
addition, it creates a unified standard-setting procedure, an enhanced mon-
itoring and supervision system, a product-recall system, and a set of national
safety standards. (34) It also abolishes the system of exemptions for “trusted”
companies, in direct response to the melamine infant milk scandal. Also, the
law addresses most particularly the issue of food additives, which was cen-
tral to the melamine scandal. Under the new law, additives are prohibited
unless proven to be not only safe but also necessary. (35)
As mandated by the new Food Safety Law, February 2010 brought the es-
tablishment of a food safety commission consisting of three vice premiers
and 12 ministerial-level officials. The Commission aims to address the prob-
lems with China’s food regulatory regime by improving government coor-
dination and enforcement, and solving systemic food safety problems. The
head of the national food safety commission, Vice Premier Li Keqiang, stated
before the State Council in Beijing in 2010, “Food is essential, and safety
should be a top priority. Food safety is closely related to people’s lives and
health and economic development and social harmony.” (36)
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23. Ibid.
24. Zhigang Wang, Yanna Mao, Fred Gale, “Chinese consumer demand for food safety attributes in
milk products,” Food Policy, vol. 33, no. 1, February 2008, pp. 27-36. This study found that almost
all Chinese urban consumers who were made aware of the risk management strategy in milk pro-
duction of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) were willing to pay a premium of
about 5 percent for HACCP-certified milk products.
25. Denis Stearns, “On (cr)edibility: Why food in the United States may never be safe,” Stanford Law
and Policy Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2010. See also Denis Stearns, “Of recycled buns, China and the
Jabberwocky,” Food Safety News, 11 May 2011.
26. United Nations in China, “Occasional Paper – Advancing Food Safety in China,” op. cit., p. 13.
27. Ibid., p. 4.
28. This report was based on a technical assistance project carried out in collaboration with China’s
State Food and Drug Administration and the World Health Organization. Roger Skinner, “Regulatory
and Strategic Framework for Food Safety in the People’s Republic of China,” SFDA, ADB, WHO
Cooperation Project, op. cit.
29. Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review – China: Report by the Secretariat, Revision,
WT/TPR/S/230/Rev.1, 5 July 2010, Part III.
30. Roger Skinner, “Regulatory and Strategic Framework for Food Safety in the People’s Republic of
China,” SFDA, ADB, WHO Cooperation Project, op. cit.
31. For a useful analysis of the effect of the melamine infant formula scandal on food safety regulation
in China, see Xiaofang Pei, Annuradha Tandon, Anton Alldrick & Liana Giorgi, “The China melamine
milk scandal and its implications for food safety regulation,” Food Policy, vol. 36, no. 3, 2001,
pp. 412-420.
32. The Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated by the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress on 28 February 2009, in force on 1 June 2009, www.procedu-
rallaw.cn/english/law/200903/t20090320_196425.html (consulted on 22 February 2012).
33. Firms that produce or sell sub-standard food may be fined up to ten times the product price, in
addition to being required to compensate for the harm caused by the product to consumers. In
severe cases criminal prosecution is also foreseen. King & Wood PRC Lawyers, “PRC Food Safety
Law: Food for Thought,” op. cit.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. “Chinese Vice-Premier orders more efforts to improve food safety,” Xinhua, 20 April 2010.
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Trade implications of China’s food-safety
regime
The new initiatives to address food safety issues in China have important
trade implications on two fronts. On one side, as discussed above, they may
go some way toward alleviating food safety concerns associated with Chi-
nese food exports and thus increase market access for these products. The
flip side of this issue is that the new regulations and procedures that com-
prise the current Chinese food safety regime may create considerable bar-
riers to the Chinese market for foreign products. 
Regulations that aim to protect the health of humans or animals against
food- or feed-borne risks, commonly known as sanitary measures, may lay
down requirements for food or agricultural products (such as requirements
regarding permissible additives in processed foods) or for the production
processes by which these food products are made (such as hygiene require-
ments for abattoirs). Examples of sanitary restrictions to access to the Chi-
nese market are its “zero-tolerance” limit for the Salmonella bacterium in
imported poultry meat; (37) its bans on animal products in response to out-
breaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”)
and H1N1 influenza (swine flu); and its maximum residue levels (MRLs) for
certain heavy metals and veterinary drugs. (38) All these measures have been
the subject of concern by China’s trading partners, which view them as un-
justifiably trade restrictive.
Sanitary measures are usually accompanied by rules regarding conformity
assessment procedures, which are control mechanisms to check compliance
with the relevant safety requirements. These may take various forms, such
as certification systems, random sampling and testing procedures, systems
for prior approval of additives, and pre-shipment inspections. They may be
imposed on products within the domestic market, for example requirements
regarding veterinary inspections of cattle within the national territory, or
on products crossing borders, either at the time of importation or exporta-
tion. (39) Examples of conformity assessment requirements in China are those
of entry/exit inspection on sanitary grounds, which is required for products
listed in China’s Catalogue of Entry-Exit Commodities Subject to Inspection
and Quarantine, (40) and of certifying the disease-free status of imported
dairy products. (41) A controversial example is China’s requirement of addi-
tional testing and inspection for H1N1 on pork products exported to China
as well as disinfection of containers, which has been questioned as dispro-
portionate and lacking in scientific justification. (42)
The potential restrictive effect of such sanitary measures and their con-
formity assessment procedures on market access for imported food prod-
ucts is clear. It is therefore interesting to examine the rules of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) that discipline the trade restrictive effect of such
health regulations and the accompanying conformity assessment proce-
dures. These disciplines are contained primarily in the Agreement on Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). (43) This agreement aims
to balance the need to further the liberalisation of trade in food and agri-
cultural products on the one hand, with the acknowledged sovereign right
of WTO Members to address the health risks arising from food or feed and
from pests and diseases of plants and animals on the other. (44)
The SPS Agreement will therefore be examined to establish the extent to
which it provides scope for China to pursue its food safety objectives, and
where the limits to such regulatory autonomy are set. This will also deter-
mine the possibilities for other WTO Members to pursue their trade interests
by using the rules of the SPS Agreement to challenge China’s sanitary meas-
ures. Before doing so, however, it is essential to understand the principle
objective of the SPS Agreement as a tool to balance the competing interests
of trade liberalisation and health protection. This matter will be addressed
first in order to provide the context within which the following discussion
should be understood.
Balancing role of the SPS Agreement
Both trade liberalisation and health protection measures pursue important
societal objectives, namely economic growth and development through the
earning of foreign revenue, and the protection of the life and health of hu-
mans, animals, and plants. However, these two objectives are often in con-
flict with one another.
On the one hand, as seen above, traded products, particularly in the food
and agricultural sector, can introduce risks to health in the importing region,
such as the transfer of infectious diseases carried by imported animals or
animal products (such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease), and food safety risks
from inadequate standards in the production, processing, or transportation
of food imports. These risks are ever-increasing due to the changing nature
of traded agri-food products. There is a growing demand for processed food
products, and thus more possibilities for contamination at various stages of
the processing chain. Risks are compounded by the use of new technologies
in agriculture and food processing, such as pesticides, additives, irradiation,
and genetic modification. Further, there is growing trade in fresh and per-
ishable products, which are more vulnerable to infection by pests and
pathogens than traditionally traded bulk agricultural commodities such as
dried grains and pulses. States thus need to take protective measures to re-
spond to citizens’ demands for food safety.
On the other hand, the sanitary measures that importing states take in
their territories to protect health from such risks are likely to act as signif-
icant barriers to market access for the exporting country, thereby reducing
its export earnings and affecting rural livelihoods. Food safety requirements
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37. United States Trade Representative, 2010 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, De-
cember 2010, p 79.
38. Ibid., p. 80.
39. One example of conformity assessment at the time of exportation is the importing company’s
requirement of export certificates. Horton notes that export certificates serve to show that a
supplier meets certain requirements and are based on the expectation that the certifying body
(either a government authority or officially recognised non-governmental organisation) will con-
duct inspections or tests to substantiate the accuracy of the information on the certificate. Linda
R. Horton, “Food from Developing Countries: Steps to Improve Compliance,” Food and Drug Law
Journal, vol. 53, no. 1, 1998, pp. 139, 147.
40. Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review – China: Report by the Secretariat, Revision,
WT/TPR/S/230/Rev.1, 5 July 2010, Part III, para 51.
41. United States Trade Representative, 2010 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, op.
cit., p. 81.
42. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Transitional Review Mechanism Pursuant to
Paragraph 18 of the Protocol on The Accession of the People’s Republic of China (“China”), Ques-
tions from the European Communities to China concerning Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
G/SPS/GEN/968, 20 October 2009, para 7.
43. It is perhaps useful to note that the SPS Agreement covers not only sanitary measures (which
aim to protect human or animal health) but also phytosanitary measures (which aim to protect
plant health). Since this contribution addresses food and feed safety issues, it will not examine
the latter category of measures. Suffice it to say that they are covered by the same disciplines in
the SPS Agreement as those discussed here.
44. It should be noted that while the WTO may lay down a best practices model for food safety reg-
ulation in the SPS Agreement, it has no competence to carry out regulatory activities itself. As
such, it cannot lay down minimum food safety standards with which its members must comply.
By contrast, the World Health Organization (WHO) has normative powers and the mandate to
address global health issues. For a critical look at the failure by the WHO to make full and effective
use of its authority to lay down food safety norms, see Ching-Fu Lin, “Global Food Safety: Exploring
key elements in an international regulatory strategy,” op. cit., pp. 673-684.
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thus have an important impact on exports in the agricultural sector (both
primary and processed products). In addition, these requirements could be
misused for protectionist purposes, thereby undermining the gradual gains
in the liberalisation of agricultural trade pursued under the WTO’s Agree-
ment on Agriculture. (45) It is notable that regulators are faced with pressure
from domestic agriculture and food industry lobbies in the face of increased
competition due to progress in agricultural liberalisation. The first hard-won
steps towards liberalising this traditionally protected sector and the subse-
quent ongoing agricultural trade liberalisation mandated by the Agreement
on Agriculture, (46) the subject of torturous and now stalled negotiations in
the context of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, (47) aim to break down
the traditional protection (tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support)
that shields domestic producers from competition. The agricultural industry
therefore lobbies regulators to erect non-tariff barriers to trade in the form
of sanitary (human and animal health) or phytosanitary (plant health) reg-
ulations.
While the potential conflict between sanitary and phytosanitary measures
and trade is not a new phenomenon, the exponential increase in the speed
and diversity of traded agri-food products in the last 50 years, and the ac-
companying proliferation of health risks and of measures to address them,
has meant that the international trade regime embodied in the rules of the
WTO has had to find new ways of mediating this conflict. The SPS Agree-
ment reflects a negotiated balance between the competing goals of the lib-
eralisation of agri-food trade and the protection of health by national
governments. In examining the rules of the SPS Agreement and their impli-
cations for China’s food safety regime, this balancing objective must be kept
in mind.
Disciplines on China’s food safety measures
under the SPS Agreement
In acceding to the WTO in December 2001 China was bound to all WTO
obligations to promote the elimination or reduction of trade barriers, in-
cluding those contained in the SPS Agreement. (48) Beijing has made signif-
icant progress in reforming its trade policy to comply with its WTO
obligations. Nevertheless, several barriers to trade remain in the form of
food safety measures, as can be seen by the concerns raised by WTO Mem-
bers during recent reviews of China’s trade policies, (49) and by EU commer-
cial operators in the Chinese market. (50) It is useful to assess these food
safety barriers in terms of the obligations laid down by the SPS Agreement.
This section will therefore focus on those disciplines of the SPS Agreement
of relevance to the aspects of China’s food safety regime that lead to trade
concerns raised by other WTO Members. It will be seen what impact these
WTO rules have on China’s new food safety regime, in order to establish
whether they threaten the progress made by China towards stronger pro-
tection against food safety risks, or instead promote a better, more rigorous
regulatory model for the promotion of food safety.
Harmonisation
The sovereign right of national governments to pursue the legitimate so-
cietal aim of the protection of health against food safety risks is recognised
by the SPS Agreement. While it requires that such measures be science-
based, non-discriminatory, and applied only to the extent necessary to pro-
tect health, the SPS Agreement leaves much room for members to make
policy choices regarding the level of health protection they wish to ensure
in their territories. These choices reflect particular conditions in each member,
including consumer preferences, economic considerations, and industry in-
terests. The specific food safety requirements that WTO Members may im-
pose to achieve their chosen level of health protection therefore also diverge.
Differences in food safety requirements can nevertheless act as significant
trade barriers as exporters are forced to adjust their products or production
processes to the different standards of their various export markets, thereby
reducing economies of scale. The promotion of harmonisation of food safety
regulations at the international level has emerged as a response to this prob-
lem. If all countries are encouraged to adopt food safety requirements that
are developed internationally, the divergence in requirements imposed on
exporters decreases, as do the costs of adapting to regulatory requirements
on export markets. As the WTO is not a regulatory body with norm-setting
capacity in the area of health, it cannot set the international standards to
be used as benchmarks. The SPS Agreement therefore encourages WTO
Members to harmonise their food safety requirements around the standards
developed by existing authoritative international bodies. (51) In the area of
food safety this is the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), and in the
area of diseases carried by animals, including those that can be transferred
to humans (zoonoses), this is the World Animal Health Organisation
(OIE). (52) Food safety measures that conform to these international stan-
dards are granted a safe harbour from challenge by other members by
means of a presumption of consistency with all the obligations of the SPS
Agreement. (53) If Members choose to apply measures reflecting a higher
level of protection than those embodied in existing international standards,
scientific justification is required in the form of a risk assessment. (54)
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trade negotiations. It takes the first steps towards liberalising the agricultural sector, which is tra-
ditionally among the most protected sectors in international trade. The Agreement on Agriculture
imposes disciplines on traditional barriers to trade in this sector, namely tariffs, domestic support,
and export subsidies. These disciplines could be undermined if complementary rules were not in
place to prevent the use of regulatory requirements for disguised protectionist purposes. See
“Agreement on Agriculture,” in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions: The Legal Texts, World Trade Organization, 1994, pp. 39-68
46. Ibid., Art. 20.
47. Ministerial Conference, Doha Ministerial Declaration. Adopted on 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, circulated on 20 November 2001, paras 13-14. The work programme set
out in the Ministerial Declaration with regard to agriculture aims at substantial improvements in
market access; a gradual phasing out of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-dis-
torting domestic support.
48. China’s WTO obligations are those contained in the WTO Agreement, including all of its Annexes,
as well as the Protocol of Accession of China to the WTO (WT/L/432), and the incorporated para-
graphs of its Working Party Report (WT/ACC/CHN/49).
49. The WTO administers a Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which conducts periodic reviews of the
trade policies of all Members, in the context of which the WTO Secretariat and the reviewed
Member submit reports that are discussed in a meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body. Other
Members may submit questions and concerns, and the reviewed Member may respond. The latest
Trade Policy Review of China was conducted in 2010, and the reports are to be found in WTO
documents WT/TPR/S/230/Rev.1 and WT/TPR/G/230. In addition, Section 18 of the Protocol of
Accession of China establishes the Transitional Review Mechanism for China. It provides for eight
years of annual reviews of China’s trade policies, concluding with a final review in the tenth year.
The reviews are conducted by the 16 subsidiary bodies of the WTO with a mandate in the specific
area of China’s WTO commitments. These bodies report to the relevant WTO specialised council,
which in turn reports to the General Council at the end of the year. The final review took place in
October 2011.
50. The recent report of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China reflects these concerns. See European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European Business in China Position Paper 2010/11, p. 167.
51. World Trade Organization, SPS Agreement, Article 3. www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sp-
sagr_e.htm (consulted on 22 February 2012).
52. Ibid., Annex A.3, (a) to (e).
53. Ibid., Article 3.2.
54. Ibid., Article 3.3 and 5.1.
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In recognition of the importance of international standards for its food
trade, both as importer and exporter, China has been a member of the CAC
since 1984 and has increased its active participation over the years. It has
established a committee comprised of relevant ministries and commissions
to deal with international standard-setting at the CAC. In 2006 China began
hosting two important CAC Committees, namely the Codex Committee on
Food Additives and the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues. However,
other WTO Members have frequently raised the complaint that China’s food
safety requirements are not based on international standards.
Inter alia, the European Commission (EC) has pointed out that China’s SPS
measures to address risks from H1N1 (swine flu) and Bovine Spongiform En-
cephalitis (BSE or mad cow disease) do not conform to the standards set by
the relevant international bodies. (55) For example, the OIE has listed which
bovine products can be safely traded regardless of the BSE status of the export-
ing country, including de-boned skeletal muscle meat from cattle. The OIE has
also classified 25 EU Member States as “controlled risk” or “negligible risk.” De-
spite this, China continues to ban beef and other bovine products from the EU.
Similarly, China continues imposing additional trade requirements on live pigs
from EU Member States in response to the H1N1 influenza pandemic, demand-
ing disease-free areas for live pigs exported to China. However, China has failed
to provide adequate scientific justification for these stricter measures in either
case. Lack of such justification constitutes a violation of the SPS Agreement.
In the same vein, the EU Chamber of Commerce has noted that with re-
spect to food additives, China’s Hygiene Standards for Uses of Food Addi-
tives include fewer than half of the additives approved for food use by the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, indicating that the Chinese legislation lags
behind the development of international standards. (56) This results in un-
justified barriers to exports from other WTO Members, and is thus vulner-
able to challenge at the WTO. (57)
The promotion of harmonised food safety requirements by the SPS Agree-
ment can be expected to provide an incentive for China to ensure that in-
ternationally recognised, science-based standards are generally used as the
basis for its food safety regulations, except where it can scientifically justify
a different choice. In harmonising its regulations, China would be able to
shield them from challenge by other Members. For this discipline to be truly
beneficial for China, however, it is important that China remain an active
participant in the international standard-setting process in order to have a
voice in the development of standards that will be the basis for its harmon-
isation efforts.
Scientific justification
Science is an essential tool used by the SPS Agreement to distinguish be-
tween measures aimed at health protection and those that are disguised
forms of trade protectionism. The centrality of science to the operation of
the SPS Agreement is thus irrefutable – it is the scale on which the com-
peting values of health protection and trade liberalisation are balanced. The
obligation of the SPS Agreement for a scientific basis to sanitary and phy-
tosanitary measures can be seen as an attempt to ensure rational, science-
based decision-making in national health regulation, and thereby to prevent
private-interest hijacking of the regulatory process. (58) In particular, in situ-
ations where harmonisation is not possible due to the lack of a relevant in-
ternational standard, or is not feasible due to differences in national
conditions or policy preferences, science operates to generate rational reg-
ulatory choices. (59)
To give effect to this objective, the SPS Agreement requires that SPS meas-
ures be based on scientific principles and not be maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence (60) (except in the case of provisional measures taken in sit-
uations of insufficiency of science, often called precautionary measures). (61)
This obligation is further fleshed out through the requirements that SPS meas-
ures be “based on” a risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances. (62)
Giving effect to these obligations, China’s new Food Safety Law provides
for a food safety risk assessment system to assess risks relating to biological,
chemical, and physical hazards in food and food additives. The findings of
food safety risk assessments not only lead to new regulations, but will also
be incorporated into revisions to food safety requirements.
However, areas still remain where scientific assessments of risk do not
form the basis for China’s food safety measures. In these instances, the sci-
entific disciplines of the SPS Agreement facilitate the efforts of exporting
countries to regain market access that has been denied without well-
founded scientific reason. For example, in 2007 the EU was able to rely on
the requirement of scientific justification in the SPS Agreement to challenge
China’s import restrictions on animal products due to alleged dioxin con-
tamination. (63) These restrictions were imposed after an isolated incident
in January 2006, after which all possibly affected products were promptly
recalled. Although all other WTO Members withdrew their trade restrictions,
China maintained its ban. The EU raised its concerns before the SPS Com-
mittee and requested that China remove the ban or provide a scientific jus-
tification for its maintenance. Technical consultations between the EU and
China followed and resulted in removal of the ban in October 2007.
A current example of a Chinese SPS measure that appears to lack a scien-
tific basis is the limitation on the level of yeast in cheese to a maximum of
50cfu/g. In other markets where cheese consumption has a longer history,
it is recognised that yeast in cheese poses no safety concern and no maxi-
mum limit is needed. (64) The measure would thus appear not to be based
55. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Transitional Review Mechanism Pursuant to
Paragraph 18 of the Protocol on The Accession of the People’s Republic of China (“China”), Ques-
tions from the European Communities to China concerning Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
G/SPS/W/262, 6 October 2011, paras 11 and 15.
56. European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European Business in China Position Paper
2010/11, op. cit., p. 168.
57. This issue was also raised by the EU in the context of the TRM. See Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Transitional Review Mechanism Pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Protocol
on The Accession of the People’s Republic of China (“China”), Questions from the European Com-
munities to China concerning Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/W/262, 6 October
2011, para 9.
58. Robert Howse, “Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade
Organization”, Michigan Law Review, vol. 98, no. 7, June 2000 p. 2329.
59. As noted by Jacqueline Peel, “The very fact of having to take a risk assessment into account and
respond to its findings could have the salutary effect of forcing national regulators ‘to articulate
objectives, to assess means, and to rationalize results,’ a substantial improvement for the regula-
tory processes of many nations.” See Jacqueline Peel, “Risk Regulation under the WTO SPS Agree-
ment: Science as an International Normative Yardstick?,” Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/04, NYU
School of Law, New York, June 2004, p. 57, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040201.pdf
(consulted on 22 February 2012). The citation referred to by Peel comes from Henrik Horn and
Joseph H.H. Weiler, “European Communities — Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and Its
Discontent,” The WTO case law of 2002: The American Law Institute reporter’s studies, pp. 248-
275.
60. Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.
61. As provided for in World Trade Organisation, SPS Agreement, op. cit., Article 5.7.
62. Ibid., Article 5.1. What is meant by a risk assessment is set out in Annex A.4 of the SPS Agree-
ment.
63. Information regarding this issue is provided in Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Specific Trade Concerns – Note by the Secretariat, G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.8/Add.3, 1 March 2011,
item 246.
64. European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European Business in China Position Paper
2010/11, op. cit., p. 170.
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on a risk assessment, as required by the SPS Agreement. A cheese exporting
WTO Member could therefore rely on the scientific disciplines of the SPS
Agreement to raise its concerns regarding this trade restriction.
One can expect that the requirement of a scientific basis for SPS measures
in the SPS Agreement will operate to ensure that China “objectively”
demonstrates the necessity of its non-harmonised food safety regulations
by reliance on risk assessments, thus avoiding the risk that regulations are
adopted in response to domestic industry protectionist pressures. This can
only benefit the food safety regime as a whole, while guarding against the
welfare-decreasing hijacking of the regulatory process by industry interest
groups. Nevertheless, the level of scientific capacity that this requirement
entails is considerable. In this area, China may benefit from technical assis-
tance by its trading partners or international initiatives such as the Stan-
dards and Trade Development Facility. (65)
Undue trade restrictiveness
While the SPS Agreement defers to the right of WTO Members to choose
the level of SPS protection they deem appropriate for their territories, (66) it
disciplines the choice of an SPS measure to achieve this level of protection.
In particular, members are obliged to ensure that their SPS measures are
not more trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level
of SPS protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility. (67)
Several instances have been noted where the conformity of China’s food
safety regime with this obligation is at issue.
For example, the EU has raised doubts as to the compatibility of the chap-
ters on imports and exports in China’s new Food Safety Law with the re-
quirement of least-trade-restrictiveness. The EC noted the vagueness of how
different procedures will work in practice, and was concerned that these
may delay the processing of imports or cause trade disruptions. (68) If alter-
native, less trade-restrictive measures can achieve the requisite level of pro-
tection from food safety risks, then the relevant chapters would be in
violation of the SPS Agreement.
One of the most important trade restrictive measures facing agri-food ex-
porters to China is the requirement of a Quarantine Inspection Permit (QIP)
before a contract may be signed for these exports to be purchased. (69)
China’s State Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quar-
antine (SAQSIQ) has discretion to annul QIPs without prior notification or
explanation, creating unpredictability for exporters. Further, delays in grant-
ing QIPs have led to shipments of agricultural products arriving in Chinese
ports of entry without QIPs, resulting in delays to product discharge and
unnecessary costs for demurrage for Chinese purchasers. (70) QIPs are granted
for limited periods (extended from three months to six months), locking
purchasers into a tight window in which to purchase, transport, and dis-
charge cargoes. (71) It may be questioned whether these QIP requirements
are the least trade-restrictive means to achieve China’s health objectives.
Another example is the “zero-tolerance” standard imposed by China on
food pathogens such as Salmonella and Listeria, which has led to several
foreign meat and poultry facilities being “delisted” (i.e., removed from the
list of facilities authorised to export to China). This measure can be seen as
unduly trade restrictive, as zero tolerance is an unattainable standard in the
case of certain unavoidable pathogens present at levels that do not pose
risks to consumers. (72)
The requirement that a food safety requirement be no more trade restric-
tive than necessary brings much-needed discipline to regulatory measures
that overreach their objectives. As such, it may serve to improve China’s
regulatory efforts by ensuring that they are rationally designed and well
suited to achieving their food safety objectives.
Transparency and adaptation period
An important and possibly underestimated aspect of the SPS Agreement
is its insistence on transparency of SPS measures. The significance of trans-
parency disciplines lies in two main areas.
First, it has what can be called ex ante effects. Exporters of food and agri-
cultural products are affected by regulatory decisions taken in foreign ju-
risdictions, yet they traditionally have no say in the decision-making process.
Foreign regulators take into account national priorities and interests when
making decisions on food safety measures. This raises the problem that
Robert Keohane has called the “external accountability gap,” (73) describing
the situation that arises in a globalising world where the impact of a state’s
actions surpasses its jurisdiction and affects the lives of persons outside it.
Imposing ex ante transparency obligations on regulating countries ensures
that exporting countries are informed of proposed new or amended food
safety measures and that affected foreign traders have the opportunity,
through their governments, to raise concerns regarding these proposed
measures and to have these comments taken into account in the regulatory
process.
The second important aspect of transparency lies in its ex post effects. An
important hurdle to exporters of food and agricultural products is the paucity
of information available regarding the food safety requirements they must
comply with in their export markets. These requirements are often complex
and subject to change, as a result of which exporters have no certainty that
their products will have access to the market of the destination country. Ob-
taining information on food safety requirements is often a costly and bur-
densome process for exporters. Transparency obligations requiring publication
of adopted food safety regulations greatly reduce the cost and difficulty of
obtaining information on trading partners’ requirements.
The ex post effect of transparency is not only important for traders, but
is also essential in enabling WTO Members to exercise their rights and police
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itary (SPS) issues. It aims to increase coordination in the provision of SPS-related assistance, and
mobilise resources to help developing countries enhance their SPS capacity.
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the implementation of the obligations of the SPS Agreement. (74) Lack of in-
formation regarding the existence, content, and scientific basis of food
safety regulations makes it difficult for members to determine whether the
SPS Agreement provides them with legal grounds to challenge measures
that serve as sanitary barriers to trade. Transparency also makes it possible
for traders to be well informed as to the effect of SPS measures on their
exports and to lobby their governments to take action in this regard. Con-
sequently, members can try to resolve their trade concerns in bilateral dis-
cussions with the relevant member, (75) in multilateral discussions at SPS
Committee meetings, or in formal dispute-settlement proceedings. For
these reasons, the SPS Agreement has rules in place to promote trans-
parency in SPS regulation. (76) These rules require not only that adopted SPS
regulations be published promptly and provide a reasonable period between
publication and entry into force of the regulation for members to adapt to
the new requirements, but also that early notice be given of draft SPS leg-
islation, along with a comment period for other members. Copies of the
draft legislation must be provided upon request.
These transparency requirements have been very weakly implemented by
China to date. (77) For example, the EU has complained that China has not
fulfilled its obligation as regards transparency towards trading partners while
developing its SPS legislation. (78) Although China has issued a vast number
of notifications of draft sanitary and phytosanitary legislation, with 619 reg-
ular and emergency measures notified since its accession in 2001, (79) the
EU notes that in practice, access to China’s SPS legislation and opportunities
to comment on the draft legislation remain limited. This is because China
has not made its regulations available in one or more WTO languages, de-
spite its accession commitment to do so. (80) In addition, according to the
EU it is not always clear whether the comments given by trading partners
are taken into account by China before it finalises its food safety regulations.
Finally, the EU has pointed out that China does not always comply with its
the obligation to allow a reasonable adaptation period between the publi-
cation of an SPS regulation and its entry into force. (81)
One specific example of the failure to comply with the transparency ob-
ligations of the SPS Agreement is the following. On 1 June 2009, China’s
new Food Safety Law and the Regulation on the Implementation of the
Food Safety Law entered into force. However, China gave no notice of either
this new legislation or its implementing regulation before implementation.
Further, other members were given no “reasonable adaptation period” as
required by the SPS Agreement between the publication of a sanitary and
phytosanitary regulation and its entry into force. (82) Such lack of trans-
parency acts as a formidable barrier to market access and is subject to chal-
lenge under the rules of the SPS Agreement.
Greater transparency in China’s food safety regulation could not only im-
prove the prospects for foreign exporters, but could also contribute to good
governance, thereby building the trust of consumers in the safety of food
products. Such confidence-building is essential in the wake of the food
safety scandals that have shaken citizens’ faith in government oversight of
the food industry.
Undue delays
In order to ensure compliance with their food safety requirements, mem-
bers usually have control, inspection, and approval procedures in place. If
these procedures are complex, lengthy, or costly, they may effectively re-
strict market access, especially in the case of perishable products. The SPS
Agreement therefore contains detailed rules on control inspection and ap-
proval procedures, which broadly aim to ensure that procedures are not
more lengthy and burdensome than is reasonable and necessary and that
they do not discriminate against imports. (83) Whether a procedural delay is
“unreasonable” depends, according to the Panel in the EC-Biotech Products
case, (84) not on the length of the delay but on whether there is a legitimate
reason or justification for it. Members imposing approval procedures must
be allowed to take the time reasonably needed to ensure with adequate
confidence that their food safety requirements are complied with.
The EU has noted that the slow progress of negotiations over sanitary
protocols and the slow progress for inspections impose considerable market
access restrictions for EU exports to China, especially for meat, fruit, and
vegetables. (85) In particular, concerns have been raised that China’s approach
to audit and inspection, which deviates from the standard laid down by the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, results in unjustified delays. Lacking ade-
quate justification, such procedural delays may be challenged under the
rules of the SPS Agreement. (86)
Conclusion
The current proliferation of food safety measures in China in response to
the growing demands of its consumers and trading partners on the one hand,
and the great advancements in trade liberalisation brought about by China’s
accession to the WTO on the other, mean that the interaction between the
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two policy areas of trade and health has assumed critical importance for
China. The impetus thus generated for concerted efforts by China to reform
its food safety regime can only be welcomed. However, these efforts should
take into account the framework of disciplines on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures contained in the WTO’s SPS Agreement. This contribution sketched
out the impact of this framework on China’s regulatory autonomy.
From the foregoing analysis it appears that the SPS Agreement should not
be seen as a hurdle to China’s ability to improve its food safety regulatory
regime. Instead, the Agreement operates to achieve a balance between the
trade and health objectives of all WTO Members. As such, it sets the limits
within which China may exercise its sovereign right to take measures to
protect consumers in its territory from food safety risks and to achieve the
level of health protection it deems appropriate.
These limits are there to promote rationality in SPS regulation and to pre-
vent restrictions that are based on unfounded fears or are a response to
protectionist pressures from the domestic industry. They can be seen as lay-
ing down a “best practices” model for food safety regulation. WTO Members
may rely on the disciplines of the SPS Agreement to challenge food safety
requirements faced by their exporters that lead to trade restrictions, either
through raising their concerns bilaterally or in the multilateral forum of the
SPS Committee, or as a last resort by bringing a dispute under the WTO dis-
pute settlement mechanism. They may also use the trade policy review
mechanism (and until recently the transitional review mechanism for China)
to highlight their concerns with reference to the disciplines of the SPS
Agreement.
To date, China’s food safety measures have been the subject of discussions
in all these fora except for the dispute settlement mechanism. WTO Mem-
bers have worked to find constructive solutions to the problems raised
rather than seeking adjudicative solutions. The EU, for example, has noted
the significant efforts made by China to reform its sanitary and phytosan-
itary regime in line with its obligations under the SPS Agreement and has
recognised that with the increase in trade this work is growing. (87) Technical
exchanges and training have been provided by China’s trading partners to
disseminate best practices in food safety. (88)
China has a formidable task before it to bring its food safety regime into
conformance with the requirements of the SPS Agreement. It must give ef-
fect to its health objectives in a manner that respects the disciplines laid
down in this Agreement, a sometimes costly and administratively burden-
some task. However, by doing so it would not only create gains for ex-
porters, but most importantly it would produce real benefits for its
consumers in the form of a rigorous and science-based food safety system.
Further, it should not be forgotten that at the same time China can, and
does, use the same Agreement to challenge the trade restrictions imposed
by its trading partners in the form of SPS requirements. (89) It is through its
careful balance between trade and health concerns that the SPS Agreement
serves the interests of all WTO Members.
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87. Ibid., para 3.
88. For example, several government agencies dealing with food safety in the US have engaged in
collaboration with Chinese regulators and producers to improve food safety practices. See F. Gale
& J.C. Buzby, “Imports from China and food safety issues,” op. cit.
89. In 2009, China initiated a WTO dispute settlement proceeding against the United States in respect
of restrictions on its poultry exports. The measure at issue was Section 727 of the US Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009, which in effect prohibited the implementation of any measures that
would allow Chinese poultry to be imported into the US by denying the use of any funding by
USDA for this purpose. The WTO Panel found the US measure in violation of the SPS Agreement,
and recommended its withdrawal. The US did not appeal this decision. See Panel Report, US –
Poultry, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010.
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